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Abstract
Large multinational companies are regularly suspected of using transfer pricing of in-
tangibles to shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the optimal transfer
prices while endogenizing the location choice of intangibles and considering spillovers. In
line with the initial intuition, we find that multinationals locate their intangibles in low-tax
jurisdictions and deploy royalty flows to minimize tax payments. However, if multina-
tionals face a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient spillover internalization, the
so-called ’home bias’ might occur. Then, for a large spillover, the intangible is optimally
located in the high-tax domestic country. This leads to less severe investment distortions
because the spillover is internalized. In addition, the model predicts that curtailing profit
shifting possibilities can either harm or facilitate multinationals’ overall investments. This
depends heavily on unobservable factors such as the underlying accounting system. There-
fore, our analysis highlights challenges for the anti-avoidance legislation of governments.
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1 Introduction
The low effective tax rates enjoyed by large multinational companies (MNCs) and the underly-
ing profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions have drawn public attention. The European Union and
its member states are particularly concerned about collecting the taxes they are owed (Drozdiak,
2017; Wall Street Journal, 2017). Transfer pricing is often used to shift profits. In particular, lo-
cating intangibles in low-tax jurisdictions and the subsequent royalty flows are effective means
of avoiding tax payments. Empirical evidence reveals that intangibles display a ‘home bias’.
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) show that the average European MNC files 57.1 percent of its
annual patent applications from the parent location. For trademarks, Heckemeyer et al. (2018)
find an even stronger ‘home bias’. They document that 95.3 percent of the U.S. trademarks
registered at the USPTO between 2003 and 2012 are owned by U.S. constituents of the S&P
500. This seems to be counterintuitive at first glance.
The unique nature and especially the public good character of intangibles allow for considerable
discretion in their location choice and respective transfer pricing. Moreover, the use of exist-
ing intangibles entails no or negligible marginal costs. Additionally, an intangible is typically
non-exclusive in its consumption, and spillovers or network effects typically occur (Lev, 2001).
These network effects may appear as spillovers from one division’s investments in intangibles
to other divisions’ profits. The internalization of these spillovers is crucial for the success of
decentralized MNCs (Roberts, 2005). The prior literature demonstrates that transfer pricing
might help to induce the internalization of spillovers (Bouwens et al., 2017). However, most of
the existing research regarding transfer pricing neglects these aspects and investigates only tax
optimization. We extend this strand of literature by incorporating both spillovers and tax opti-
mization. Tax-saving incentives may interfere with the internalization incentives of spillovers,
therefore affecting the location choice and the respective transfer pricing. The objective of this
paper is to shed light on the impact of an intangible’s specific characteristics on its location
choice and corresponding transfer pricing decisions.
Regarding the unique characteristics of intangibles, we focus on missing marginal costs for us-
ing an existing intangible, spillovers, non-rivalry in its consumption, and the ease of the location
choice. In particular, we examine the following research questions: Is the intangible optimally
1
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located in the high- or in the low-tax jurisdiction? That is, do MNCs exhibit a ‘home bias’ for
their location choice of intangibles? How does a spillover influence the MNCs’ location choice,
respective royalty payments, and corresponding investment decisions related to intangibles?
We consider a decentralized MNC comprising a headquarters and a domestic and a foreign divi-
sion. The MNC’s headquarters and the domestic division are located in a high-tax jurisdiction.
The foreign division operates in a low-tax country. Each division seeks to maximize its after-
tax divisional profits. The MNC has a ready-to-use intangible (for example, a brand, a patent,
a database, or a quality concept) and headquarters determines this intangible’s location, i.e.,
which part of the MNC owns the intangible. This intangible is separately used by the MNC’s
divisions. The use of the intangible by one division is not detrimental to the consumption pos-
sibilities of the other division, and marginal costs do not arise from its use. In order to sustain
or even increase the expected benefits resulting from the intangible, the divisions using it need
to invest in maintenance (Roberts, 2005; Sandner and Block, 2011). For example, creating a
brand, a patent, or a database is usually the first step. Failure to maintain the brand in each mar-
ket might result in its deterioration. Similarly, an unmaintained database might soon become
out-of-date and thus useless. Failing to maintain or even establish the MNC’s operations accord-
ing to the patent’s technology means that the patent’s profit potential cannot be realized. These
maintenance investments may create spillovers for other divisions, i.e., one division might ben-
efit from the maintenance investment of another division. For example, advertising investments
in the domestic country may also increase the awareness of a brand in a foreign country through
word-of-mouth, internet presence, or product placement in movies, sitcoms, and talk shows. In
the considered setting, transfer pricing has two functions: first, paying for the use of the ex-
isting intangible and, second, providing the divisions with incentives for making maintenance
investments. This results in two potentially conflicting objectives of transfer pricing.
The MNC can either implement a one set of books (OSB) or two sets of books (TSB) transfer
pricing system. Empirical findings indicate that both accounting systems are used (Klassen
et al., 2017; Springsteel, 1999), so we consider each system. First, a OSB setting is investigated
where a single transfer price is determined to induce optimal maintenance investments and
report the taxable income. Second, we consider a TSB setting that allows the MNC to decouple
2
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its internal decision making from external reporting.1
When an MNC faces no restrictions on internal transfer pricing, the foreign division operating
in the low-tax jurisdiction owns the intangible. The external royalty rate2 is straightforwardly
the highest acceptable rate. Thus, profit is shifted to the low-tax jurisdiction. In general, the
optimal internal royalty rate does not equal zero despite the lack of costs incurred from using
the intangible. The reason is that adequate maintenance investments are induced by non-zero
internal royalty rates. Specifically, the optimal internal royalty rate is positive (negative) for a
small (high) spillover. Thus, with a high spillover, the domestic division receives a maintenance
investment subsidy. This is beneficial for the foreign division because the domestic division
internalizes its spillover on the foreign division’s contribution margin.
Despite the huge tax-saving potential of intangibles’ transfer pricing, companies aim at comply-
ing with tax law (Economist, 2004; Cools and Emmanuel, 2006; Cools and Slagmulder, 2009).
Moreover, Klassen et al. (2017) have shown in a survey regarding transfer pricing strategies
for large multinationals that the majority of MNCs prioritized preventing disputes with tax au-
thorities above the tax minimization objective. Mills (1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) have
highlighted that large book-tax differences create red flags for tax authorities. The identification
of large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices has similar consequences.
Thus, an MNC using TSB with large differences between internal and taxable income induces
increased scrutiny by tax authorities (EY, 2003). Although, tax avoidance is perfectly legal,
higher scrutiny by tax authorities is undesirable since participation in the audit process is costly.
On the one hand, time needs to be spent preparing for the audit. On the other hand, tax pro-
fessionals charge fees for representation. Beck et al. (2000) term this the audit participation
penalty. Thus, MNCs aim at avoiding long-lasting audits and disputes. Therefore, MNCs re-
frain from creating large discrepancies. This creates restrictions on an MNC’s transfer pricing.
In particular, we consider a restriction on an MNC’s internal transfer price. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that MNCs refrain from using negative internal royalty rates, while the
1 We are not interested in the question of whether OSB or TSB is preferable or used in equilibrium. There is literature
investigating this question (see, for example, Haak et al. (2017)).
2 The MNC uses royalty-based transfer pricing, so we use the terms royalty rate and transfer price interchangeably
throughout the paper.
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arm’s length principle requires positive external royalty rates. This non-negativity assumption
is a surrogate for a restriction on transfer pricing when MNCs focus on preventing disputes trig-
gered by large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices. In our model, other
restrictions regarding excessive discrepancies between the internal and external transfer price
will yield qualitatively identical effects.
When restrictions on the internal royalty rate are present, i.e., either TSB with restrictions or
OSB, locating the intangible in the low-tax foreign jurisdiction is discouraged. Then, assign-
ing ownership to the high-tax country can be optimal. Specifically, for small (large) spillovers,
the intangible is optimally located in the low-tax (high-tax) jurisdiction. The MNC faces the
following trade-off. On the one hand, tax-saving behavior is most effective when the foreign
division owns the intangible. On the other hand, better internalization of the spillover is ob-
tained when the intangible is located in the high-tax domestic jurisdiction. For a large spillover,
internalization becomes more important. That is, the threat of inconclusive but long-lasting and
expensive disputes with the tax authority caused by large discrepancies between internal and
external transfer prices can induce MNCs to locate the intangible in the domestic, high-tax ju-
risdiction. Thus, our findings illustrate that a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient
spillover internalization may explain the empirical evidence on MNCs’ tendency to hold intan-
gibles in the parent’s high-tax jurisdiction, the so-called ‘home bias’ (Karkinsky and Riedel,
2012; Griffith et al., 2014; Dischinger et al., 2014; Heckemeyer et al., 2018).
Tax authorities and governments determine the MNCs’ abilities to engage in profitable profit
shifting by defining the legal environment. Our results show that the effect of curtailing profit
shifting possibilities is intricate. Indeed, restricting profit shifting can harm domestic invest-
ment. This is in line with prior research (Desai et al., 2006; Hong and Smart, 2010; Juranek
et al., 2018). However, we extend this strand of literature by showing that whether lower profit
shifting possibilities are detrimental for investment incentives depends on the underlying ac-
counting system and the spillover’s magnitude. If TSB with restrictions are in place, transfer
pricing is already used to optimally tackle tax minimization and induce investment decisions.
Thus, decreasing profit shifting possibilities leads to decreased investment. However, under an
OSB accounting system, the transfer pricing decision simultaneously targets tax optimization
and providing investment incentives. Hence, reducing profit shifting possibilities mitigates the
4
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trade-off because the tax-saving possibilities decrease. This, in turn, may either increase or
decrease investment incentives depending on which objective dominates the decision.
This highlights the problem regulators face when designing anti-avoidance legislation. On the
one hand, governments are interested in collecting the taxes they are owed and therefore intro-
duce countermeasures to circumvent profit shifting and tax avoidance, such as the recent BEPS
project. However, our results show that the outcome of restricting profit shifting depends on
the accounting system in place and the spillover’s magnitude. The coexistence of different ac-
counting systems and spillovers are only two of a variety of factors that could lead to unintended
consequences. Thus, our results show that implementing anti-avoidance regulations is a very
complex task.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, the related literature
and the model are presented. Then, section 4 presents two benchmark cases. The first-best
solution and a no-tax world are considered. Section 5 depicts the optimal location choice under
OSB. Section 6 discusses the location choice when the MNC keeps TSB and restrictions on
internal royalty rates are either absent or present. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) illustrate that taxes affect the attraction of additional capital invest-
ment. Our findings show that curtailing profit shifting possibilities can either reduce or increase
MNCs’ incentives to invest in intangible maintenance.
The literature on transfer pricing for intangibles (with tax considerations) is scarce. Johnson
(2006) examines different transfer pricing methods for intangibles. In the studied setting, two
divisions consecutively create the intangible. Her results highlight that royalty-based transfer
pricing with renegotiation can achieve the first-best investment incentives when the investments
are either quasi-independent or substitutes. As we concentrate on compliant tax avoidance
and negotiated transfer prices are perceived as potentially harming tax compliance (Cools and
Slagmulder, 2009), our analysis is restricted to royalty-based transfer pricing. We add to the
findings of Johnson (2006) by showing that spillovers affect internal transfer prices and that an
MNC facing a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient spillover internalization may
exhibit a ‘home bias’.
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De Simone and Sansing (2014) investigate whether cost sharing arrangements serve to shift
intellectual property offshore to low-tax jurisdictions in the presence of spillovers from market-
ing intangibles. They show that a cost sharing arrangement can be useful to shift profits if the
spillover of the domestic division exceeds the foreign spillover on domestic profits. This result
occurs because the Internal Revenue Service assumes that marketing intangibles increase only
the profits of the division that owns them. Hence, spillovers are neglected in IRS considerations.
We show that it is crucial to consider spillovers to estimate the consequences of regulatory activ-
ities. Bornemann (2018) additionally investigates different consequences of cost sharing versus
licensing agreements. He finds that investment-specific characteristics affect the decision to
design a contract as a licensing or cost sharing agreement. In contrast to De Simone and Sans-
ing (2014) and Bornemann (2018), we investigate the location choice of an existing intangible
rather than its development because empirical findings show that an intangible’s development
and subsequent location choice can easily be disentangled (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).
De Waegenaere et al. (2012) model a patent race among MNCs making research and develop-
ment investments and the subsequent production of tangible assets. During the production of
tangible assets, the intangible is exploited. The production can take place either domestically
or in the foreign country. De Waegenaere et al. (2012) show that weaker enforcement of the
arm’s length principle may improve social welfare. We find related results by showing that
narrowing the arm’s length range can harm the investments of an MNC. We extend their find-
ings by showing that investment incentives can also increase depending on spillovers and the
accounting system in place.
Recently, Juranek et al. (2018) investigate how different methods employed in determining
an arm’s length price influence MNCs’ investment decisions when the intangible is located in
a low-tax jurisdiction. Moreover, they are interested in the appropriateness of a source tax
for reducing profit shifting via royalties. We add to their findings by considering different
accounting systems and a spillover. We show that a spillover combined with decreasing profit
shifting possibilities can also induce increasing investment incentives. For a high spillover, in
line with the empirically documented ‘home bias’, we find that locating the intangible in the
high-tax country can become optimal. Then, it becomes possible to internalize the spillover in
the MNC’s investment decisions. Moreover, we respond to the call by Shackelford and Shevlin
6
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314732 
(2001) for more theoretical research regarding the development of theories allowing for the
development of testable hypotheses.
In addition, we contribute to the empirical literature on the location choice for intangibles
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014; Dischinger et al., 2014; Heckemeyer et al.,
2018). This literature offers several potential explanations for a ‘home bias’. These are that
headquarters often finances the development of the intangible and bears the risk, making it the
legal owner of the intangible (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). Moreover, the headquarters exhibits
economies of scale in the administration and management process of intangibles (Karkinsky and
Riedel, 2012; Heckemeyer et al., 2018), and headquarters’ managers value their influence over
valuable assets and, thus, seek to keep them at the headquarters (Dischinger et al., 2014). Fur-
thermore, MNCs want to avoid taxes upon the repatriation of profits from the foreign division
to the headquarters (Dischinger et al., 2014) and to minimize payments regarding withholding
taxes (Heckemeyer et al., 2018). Additionally, particularities in tax transfer pricing regulation
and the law regulating and protecting the intangible can make transferring the intangible to the
low-tax jurisdiction unattractive (Heckemeyer et al., 2018).
Whereas these antecedents of the ‘home bias’ are mostly related to particularities of tax regula-
tions and law, we illustrate the impact of spillovers on the location choice for intangibles. Thus,
we provide an additional economic explanation for the ‘home bias’ documented in the empiri-
cal literature. In addition, our model predicts that the ‘home bias’ of trademarks is most likely
larger than the ‘home bias’ of patents. This implication is supported by empirical evidence
reported by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Heckemeyer et al. (2018).
3 Model Description
We investigate whether an intangible should be located in the low-tax country when restrictions
on transfer pricing exist. We are interested in the implications of the location choice and an
MNC’s maintenance investments. Therefore, in line with prior work of Juranek et al. (2018),
we neglect the initial invention and innovation of the intangible. According to the findings of
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2017), neglecting the development
of an intangible is not restrictive. They show that the development of an intangible and its
actual location are independent. This becomes even more relevant if exit taxes are considered.
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Obviously, exit taxes make a relocation less attractive. Thus, MNCs will attempt to avoid costly
relocations by anticipating subsequent consequences and determine the intangible’s location ex
ante. This is in line with empirical findings that the location choice of an intangible typically
takes place at an early stage of the development process when the intangible’s prospects are
highly uncertain. Thus, we assume that MNCs anticipate the consequences of their location
choice, so that the location choice takes place ex ante and no relocation occurs.
We consider a divisionalized MNC operating in a low- and a high-tax country. The MNC has a
ready-to-use intangible and comprises a headquarters HQ, a domestic division D, and a foreign
division F . The foreign division operates in the low-tax jurisdiction. Its income is taxed at
tax rate t. The headquarters and the domestic division are located in the high-tax jurisdiction,
where their income is taxed at rate t + h, where 0 < t,h < 1 and t + h < 1. Both divisions
generate profits using the existing intangible. These profits can be increased by maintenance
investments of each division j, with j=F,D. The maintenance investments are costly c j = k2θ
2
j ,
with j = F,D, where k > 0 denotes the unit cost of the investment, and θ j ∈ [0,1] is division j’s
investment. We assume that k is sufficiently large in order to ensure that 0≤ θ j ≤ 1 holds true.
Maintenance investments are expensed. Division j decides on the investment θ j to maximize
the division’s after-tax profit Π j. The headquarters cannot verify the total investment.3 Thus,
it is not possible for the headquarters to administer the maintenance investments.4 These costs
reduce the investing division’s taxable income. Division j generates direct contribution margin
x j, which is either high or low, where division j’s investment θ j determines the probability of
obtaining the high direct contribution margin. That is, x j = 1 is realized with probability θ j.
Otherwise, the investing division faces the baseline contribution margin, which we normalize
without loss of generality to x j = 0.
We assume that the investment of the high-tax division has a spillover β , with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, on
the contribution margin of the foreign division (the indirect effect on the contribution margin).
All results hold true if we consider bilateral spillovers as long as the domestic spillover exceeds
the foreign spillover. Thus, we normalize the spillover from the foreign division’s investment
3 This is a standard assumption in the literature (Johnson, 2006).
4 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each division has additional operations generating revenues and costs,
so that the investment expenditures c j cannot be inferred.
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on the domestic division’s contribution margin to zero. Of course, negative spillovers might
also occur. However, if a sufficiently detrimental spillover is expected, it would be reasonable
to deny the non-owning division access to the intangible imposing negative externalities on the
other division. A typical example of negative spillovers are luxury brands. The allowance to
use the brand name in other divisions can be detrimental by inflating the market and thereby de-
stroying the exclusiveness of the brand. For example, Burberry recently attracted adverse media
attention by burning tons of clothes rather than discounting them and thereby possibly inflating
the market.5 This shows that MNCs attempt to prevent negative expected spillovers. Thus, in
expectation, the spillover should be positive. Therefore, we assume a positive spillover. In line
with Bouwens et al. (2017), we model a linear spillover. That is, the total contribution margin
of the low-tax division is MF = xF + βxD, whereas the contribution margin of the domestic
division is determined solely by its own investments, i.e., MD = xD.
Due to the specific features of intangibles, the boundaries of ownership are blurred. In partic-
ular, the non-rivalry in consumption allows both divisions to use the intangible without facing
scarcity. However, the owning division has the right to decide whether other parties are allowed
to use the intangible or not. In particular, the legal owner of the intangible is determined by the
right to enjoy, sell, rent, or even destroy an item of property. In line with prior research (Gross-
man and Hart, 1986), we define the owner of an intangible as the residual claimant. However,
in contrast to Grossman and Hart (1986), the right to determine corresponding quantities or
investments does not belong to the residual rights in our setting.
The headquarters locates the ready-to-use intangible in order to maximize its overall after-tax
profitΠHQ.6 The headquarters has various strategic choices. On the one hand, it can decide that
one of its two divisions legally owns the intangible. On the other hand, the headquarters can
own the intangible or decide that both divisions jointly hold the intangible. That is, we consider
four possibilities for the intangible’s location. Either, the domestic division, the foreign division,
both divisions jointly, or the headquarters can own the intangible.
5 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44885983.
6 The divisions’ after-tax profits ΠD and ΠF and the headquarters’ after-tax profit ΠHQ depend on the location
choice, the determined royalty rates, and the accounting system in place. Whenever necessary, we present the
expected profit functions in the main text or the appendix.
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We consider an administered transfer pricing environment, i.e., the price setting power remains
under the headquarters’ control for all ownership possibilities. Based on prior research, we
tie the royalty rate γ ∈ R to the non-owning division’s contribution margin (see, for example,
Johnson (2006) and Bornemann (2018)). The headquarters chooses the transfer prices, i.e., the
internal and the external royalty rate, in order to maximize the overall after-tax profit. To ensure
that our results do not depend on the underlying but unobservable accounting system, we con-
duct the analysis twice. First, we consider an OSB setting. Afterward, we investigate the TSB
case. In the TSB case, the MNC disentangles the royalty rates for internal and external pur-
poses. In particular, investment decisions might be affected by an internal royalty rate γi ∈ R,
whereas the external royalty rate γr ∈
[
γr,γr
]
with 0 < γr < γr < 1 serves for tax reporting. This
range reflects the acceptable arm’s length royalty rates. In line with the transfer pricing litera-
ture, we assume exogenous boundaries for the arm’s length range (see, for example, Baldenius
et al. (2004) and Johnson (2006)). Since we are interested in tax avoidance rather than illegal
tax evasion, the MNC always chooses a price from this exogenous arm’s length range. 7 The
timing of the game is depicted in figure 1.
Location
choice for
exisiting
intangible
t=0
HQ
determines the
royalty rate(s)
t=1
Division F and
D decide on
θD and θF ,
respectively
t=2
Payoffs are
realized
t=3
Figure 1: Timeline
4 Benchmark Cases
We now turn to the analysis of the location choice. This section provides two benchmarks to
demonstrate that the ‘home bias’ does not occur in the first-best solution or in a no-tax world.
In particular, in the first benchmark, we examine the location choice when the headquarters ob-
7 Juranek et al. (2018) investigate how different transfer pricing methods and the possibly differing arm’s length
ranges influence profit shifting with intangibles.
10
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314732 
serves and dictates the investment decisions, i.e., the first-best solution. The second benchmark
considers a no-tax world.
4.1 Benchmark 1: First-Best Solution
In the first-best solution, the headquarters observes the divisions’ investment decisions. If the
divisions implement investment levels different from the headquarters’ preferred ones, the head-
quarters can punish the division managers. Therefore, investment decisions according to the
headquarters’ preferences are induced.
Locating the intangible in the foreign division allows the MNC to legally shift profits from the
high- to the low-tax jurisdiction. This reduces the MNC’s tax liability, so that locating the intan-
gible in the foreign division is preferred to ownership by the domestic division, headquarters,
or joint ownership.
If the headquarters assigns ownership to the foreign division, the domestic division makes a
royalty payment to the low-tax jurisdiction. The maximum profit is shifted to the low-tax ju-
risdiction by setting the external royalty rate as high as possible, i.e., γr = γr. The first-best
investment decisions of the headquarters are:8
θD, f b =
1
k
+
β (1− t)+hγr
k(1− t−h) ,
θF, f b =
1
k
.
Obviously, the domestic investment level is increasing in the spillover β , and the foreign invest-
ment is unaffected.
Lemma 1. In the first-best solution, the MNC locates the intangible in the low-tax foreign
division.
4.2 Benchmark 2: No-Tax World
As a second benchmark, we investigate which location is preferable in a no-tax world. This
enables us to isolate tax effects in the next section. This is especially interesting because MNCs
are often suspected to locate their intangibles solely to reduce their tax liability. Without tax
8 All proofs are stated in the appendix.
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regulation, the MNC is free to design its royalty scheme in order to maximize the overall profit.
We acknowledge that taxes induce different first-best investments than in a no-tax world. There-
fore, the first-best investments of the domestic division are affected by taxes, so that we consider
an adapted level of the first-best domestic investment in a no-tax world. First-best investments
cannot be achieved if the domestic division owns the intangible. Basically, the royalty payment
from the foreign division leads to a partial internalization of the indirect effect on the foreign
contribution margin. However, a royalty payment reduces the investment incentives of the for-
eign division in a no-tax world. Hence, a trade-off is inherent in designing the transfer pricing
scheme even without taxes.9 This negative effect can easily be avoided as the following analysis
shows. Legal ownership can be assigned to the foreign division. Then, transfer pricing is used
to affect the divisions’ decisions regarding maintenance investments. The domestic division
expects the following profit:10
E
[
ΠFD,NT
]
= (1− γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and the foreign division’s profit comprises its own revenues and the royalty income. Hence, its
expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠFF,NT
]
= θF +θD (β + γ)− k2θ
2
F .
Hence, the division’s investment decisions are as follows:
θFD,NT =
1− γ
k
and
θFF,NT =
1
k
.
Thus, the investment incentives of the foreign division are not affected by the royalty payment.
Nevertheless, the foreign division is also interested in providing investment incentives to the
domestic division due to the indirect effect on its own contribution margin. Obviously, a royalty
9 The proofs for all four considered ownership settings are in the appendix.
10 The subscript NT highlights the no-tax cases, whereas the absence of the NT subscript signals tax world consider-
ations. The superscript indicates the owner of the intangible.
12
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rate γFNT = −β induces the first-best domestic investment. For economic reasons, this royalty
rate is negative and can be interpreted as an investment subsidy. Although the foreign division
owns the intangible, it pays an investment subsidy to the domestic division to ensure that the
spillover is internalized correctly.
The same result is achieved if the headquarters owns the intangible. Then, both divisions have to
pay royalties in order to secure access to the intangible. First-best investments can be achieved
if the foreign division uses the intangible free of charge. Thus, the headquarters asks for a zero
royalty γHQF,NT = 0. Furthermore, the headquarters pays an investment subsidy, i.e., γ
HQ
D,NT =−β
to the domestic division to induce the spillover’s internalization. Hence, first-best investments
in both divisions require a redistribution of profits. In a no-tax world without any restrictions
concerning the royalty rate, profit shifting is necessary to induce optimal maintenance invest-
ments.
With joint ownership, an investment subsidy might be profit enhancing. However, no subsidy
can be found that the foreign division is willing to accept. Both divisions own the intangible,
so that no royalties are paid, and first-best investments cannot be induced. Hence, foreign
ownership or ownership by the domestic headquarters dominates joint ownership.
Proposition 1. Without taxes, the MNC is indifferent between locating the intangible in the
domestic headquarters or abroad. For either location choice, first-best investments can be
induced. Despite the absence of marginal costs, optimal transfer pricing includes non-zero
royalty rates.
5 Location Choice of Intangibles under OSB
Before examining the TSB case in section 6, we investigate the OSB setting in this section. That
is, we restrict the MNC’s transfer pricing flexibility by requiring the internal and the external
royalty rate to coincide.
5.1 Royalty Rates and Location Choices under OSB
If the foreign division owns the intangible, the overall after-tax profit contains a tax-saving
position. Thus, the headquarters’ expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+(1− t)
[
βθD+θF − k2θ
2
F
]
+hγrθD. (1)
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Under an OSB setting, a single royalty rate has to be determined that balances the conflicting
objectives and therefore maximizes the headquarters’ overall after-tax profit. The entire transfer
pricing decision is restricted to the interval
[
γr,γr
]
because we focus on legal tax avoidance.
Thus, a trade-off is inherent in the MNC’s decision. The resulting transfer pricing decision if
the intangible is located in the foreign division is given by:11
γF,OSBr =

γr for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
h−(1−t)β
1−t+h for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
γr for β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,1
]
.
(2)
The divisions’ investment choices with foreign ownership are:
θF,OSBD =
1
k
(
1− γF,OSBr
)
, (3)
θF,OSBF =
1
k
. (4)
If the domestic division owns the intangible, the overall after-tax profit contains a term indi-
cating that incoming royalties have to be taxed at the higher tax rate. Thus, the headquarters’
expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+(1− t)
[
βθD+θF − k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (βθD+θF) . (5)
The resulting transfer pricing decision if the intangible is located in the domestic division is
given by:
γD,OSBr =

γr for β ∈
[
0,βD,OSB1
]
(1−t)β 2−h(1+β )
β 2(1−t+h)+1−t−2h for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
γr for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
(6)
11 All threshold values and findings in this section are presented in the appendix.
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The divisions’ investment choices with domestic ownership are:
θD,OSBD =
1
k
(
1+βγD,OSBr
)
, (7)
θD,OSBF =
1
k
(
1− γD,OSBr
)
. (8)
With joint ownership, the effect of the spillover is never internalized. That is, both divisions
invest 1/k.
For a low spillover, i.e., β < βFJ ,12 it is optimal to locate the intangible abroad. The ownership
of the intangible is assigned to the foreign division, and profits are shifted effectively. While
the foreign division implements the first-best investment decision, the domestic division under-
invests relative to the first-best solution. This investment distortion is small for a low spillover,
so that the tax-saving motive drives the location choice. That is, even for the most restrictive
internal pricing policy, i.e., forcing MNCs to use OSB, the tax-saving motive dominates the
location choice for a small spillover.
The MNC only uses the most tax-effective transfer price γr for a very low spillover, i.e., for
β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
.13 Otherwise, a transfer price smaller than γr, i.e., either h−(1−t)β1−t+h or γr, is used
(see equation (2)). That is, the MNC mitigates the investment distortion by partially forgoing
the profit shifting benefits.
If the spillover is high, the investment distortion is detrimental. Therefore, investment decisions
drive the location choice. In case of joint ownership, profit shifting does not occur at all. Addi-
tionally, while the foreign division still invests according to the first-best solution, the domestic
division underinvests less relative to the foreign ownership case. Hence, for a medium spillover,
joint ownership becomes optimal in the OSB setting.
The intangible is optimally held in the high-tax jurisdiction for a high spillover. The domestic
division owns the intangible under OSB for a high spillover to mitigate the investment distortion.
In particular, compared to foreign and joint ownership, the domestic division underinvests less
in this case. Paying a royalty induces the foreign division to underinvest. The spillover is so
12 The superscript F and the subscript J indicate that the threshold βFJ is the level of the spillover at which the
headquarters is indifferent between locating the intangible in the foreign division or using joint ownership.
13 As outlined in the appendix: 0 < βF,OSB1 < β
F,OSB
2 < β
F
J .
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important that profit shifting to the high-tax country is accepted as a consequence. In sum,
we can show that the intangible is located in the high-tax jurisdiction for a high spillover, i.e.,
β ≥ βDJ , where βDJ < βD,OSB1 .14
For β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
, profits are shifted to the high-tax country using the least harmful transfer
price γr. When the spillover is very high, i.e., β > βD,OSB1 , the investment distortions are the
most severe. Then, the MNC is willing to shift more profits to the high-tax country by setting
a transfer price larger than γr (see equation (6)). Our findings are summarized in proposition 2
and illustrated in figure 2.
Proposition 2. For h < 3−
√
5
2 (1− t) and γr < 1−t1−t+h ,15 under an OSB accounting system, and
• a low spillover, i.e., β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in the low-tax foreign division,
• a medium spillover, i.e, βFJ < β < βDJ , joint ownership is optimal,
• a high spillover, i.e., β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the high-tax domestic division.
Figure 2: Expected Firm Profits with Foreign (F), Joint (J) and Domestic (D) Ownership under
OSB (plotted for γr = 0.1,γr = 0.5, t = 0.2,h = 0.15, and k = 3)
14 The superscript D and the subscript J indicate that the threshold βDJ is the level of the spillover at which the
headquarters is indifferent between locating the intangible in the domestic division or using joint ownership.
15 The first threshold is decreasing in the tax rate t. For t = 0.1 or t = 0.3, the first threshold allows a maximal tax
rate differential of 0.344 or 0.267, respectively. The second threshold is decreasing in t and h. For t = 0.3 and
h= 0.25, the maximal upper bound of the arm’s length range γr is 0.737. That is, numerous tax jurisdictions fulfill
these two criteria regarding h and γr.
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5.2 Profit Shifting Effects on Investments under OSB
Next, we examine the effect of various exogenous factors on our OSB findings. For β ∈[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
, an increase in the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr reduces the domestic
investment when the intangible is located abroad. Thus, greater investment distortion results
from an increasing γr, while the investment with joint ownership is unaffected. As a conse-
quence, the higher the lower bound of the arm’s length range is, the lower the spillover needs to
be for the headquarters to favor foreign ownership. For β ∈
[
βFJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
and domestic own-
ership, a higher arm’s length price γr reduces the domestic investment distortion by increasing
domestic investment. However, the investment distortion of the foreign division increases. A
higher γr induces more profits being shifted from the low- to the high-tax jurisdiction. This un-
favorable effect dominates the investment effects, so that a higher spillover is needed to induce
the headquarters to locate the intangible in the domestic division.
For β ∈
[
βF,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
]
, an increase in the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr does not
affect the divisions’ investment decisions because the used transfer price is smaller than γr. That
is, the attractiveness of domestic, foreign, or joint ownership is unaffected by a rise in γr.
Furthermore, an increasing tax rate differential h makes profit shifting to the low-tax jurisdiction
more attractive and profit shifting to the high-tax jurisdiction more costly. Therefore, a higher
spillover is required to make it optimal for the headquarters to use joint and domestic ownership.
Corollary 1. The threshold levels of the spillover βFJ and βDJ are
• decreasing and increasing in the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr, respectively,
• unaffected by a rise in the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr, and
• increasing in the tax rate differential h.
When the headquarters uses a transfer price that is an interior value from the arm’s length range,
i.e., β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
or β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
, the spillover β affects the royalty rate. A
higher spillover increases the importance of domestic investment. Thus, lowering the royalty
rate under foreign ownership provides higher investment incentives to the domestic division.
Under domestic ownership, a higher royalty rate provides the domestic division with a larger
share of the spillover effect. Therefore, the domestic division’s investment incentives increase.
However, an increasing spillover does not affect the royalty rate when the headquarters has
already applied a corner value of the arm’s length range.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Narrowing the Arm’s Length Range on the Investment Incentives for the MNC under
OSB (γr is the transfer price; β is the spillover from domestic investment to the foreign contribution margin)
Proposition 3. For foreign ownership and OSB, an increasing spillover either decreases the
royalty rate or the royalty rate is unaffected.
For domestic ownership and OSB, an increasing spillover either increases the royalty rate or
the royalty rate is unaffected.
We are also interested in the effect of reducing the MNC’s profit shifting possibilities by nar-
rowing the arm’s length range. Whenever the headquarters applies a corner value of the arm’s
length range as the transfer price, the divisions’ investments are affected by an increasing lower
bound or a decreasing upper bound. Specifically, a higher lower bound is detrimental to the
MNC’s investment incentives, while a lower upper bound fosters these incentives. This is sum-
marized in proposition 4 and depicted in figure 3.
Proposition 4. For β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
or β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
, curtailing profit shifting possibilities by
narrowing the arm’s length range leads to increased investment incentives for the MNC under
OSB.
For β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
or β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
, curtailing profit shifting possibilities by narrowing
the arm’s length range leads to decreased investment incentives for the MNC under OSB.
For any other spillover β , curtailing profit shifting possibilities by narrowing the arm’s length
range does not affect the investment incentives for the MNC under OSB.
The tax rate differential h affects the divisions’ investment choices only when the headquarters
does not use a corner value of the arm’s length range. A higher tax rate differential increases
the benefits from shifting profits from the high- to the low-tax jurisdiction but does not affect
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the benefits from the spillover. The MNC reacts to the higher tax-saving potential by increasing
(decreasing) the royalty rate under foreign (domestic) ownership. This results in lower domestic
investment. In the case of domestic ownership, due to the lower royalty rate, the foreign division
retains a higher share of its contribution margin. That is, the marginal benefits from foreign
investment on foreign profits increase, while the marginal investment costs are unaffected. Thus,
the foreign division invests more. When the headquarters uses a corner value of the arm’s length
range as the transfer price, a rise in the tax rate differential does not affect the royalty rate.
Therefore, domestic and foreign investment are unaffected.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the MNC keeps OSB. An increasing tax rate differential
• decreases or does not affect domestic investment and
• increases or does not affect foreign investment.
6 Location Choice of Intangibles under TSB
The conflict between the different objectives is mitigated by keeping TSB because the head-
quarters faces a higher degree of freedom in using different royalty rates for different purposes.
Hence, relaxing the requirement that the internal and external royalty rates have to coincide
makes the trade-off less severe.
6.1 No Restriction on Transfer Pricing
In a TSB setting without any restrictions on the internal royalty rate, foreign ownership domi-
nates.16 Specifically, the expected profits are given by:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
− γiθD+ γrθD (t+h)
and
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+ γiθD− tγrθD.
The headquarters’ expected profit is given by equation (1), which was introduced in section
5. The internal royalty rate is only implicitly considered in the headquarters’ expected profit
16 All proofs are in the appendix.
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because it affects the investment decisions of divisional managers. Since the internal incen-
tive provision and external reporting objectives are decoupled, it is obvious that the MNC is
interested in the highest possible external transfer price under foreign ownership, i.e., γr, to
maximize its tax savings. The divisions choose their investment levels to maximize their own
after-tax profits.The divisions’ investment decisions are given by:
θFD =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)− γi] (9)
and
θFF =
1
k
. (10)
Stipulating the following internal royalty rate induces first-best investments:
γFi = γrt− (1− t)β . (11)
In this subsection, we do not consider restrictions on transfer prices, so that this internal roy-
alty rate becomes negative for a high spillover β . Then, the foreign division subsidizes the
investment of the domestic division. Therefore, the spillover is optimally exploited. Hence,
the underinvestment problem present under OSB is alleviated. In addition to the internalization
problem, maximal tax savings can be generated by legally shifting profits from the high-tax to
the low-tax jurisdiction.
6.2 Restriction on Transfer Pricing and Resulting Home Bias
Recently, Mescall and Klassen (2018) demonstrate that MNCs incorporate the transfer pricing
risk due to potential future tax audits into their considerations. Moreover, extant evidence has
shown that large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices entail increased
scrutiny in a potential tax audit (Badertscher et al., 2009; Mills, 1998; Mills and Sansing, 2000;
Chen and Gavious, 2017). That is, MNCs focusing on preventing long-lasting and costly dis-
putes with the tax authority consider restrictions on transfer pricing to avoid large discrepancies.
We assume that internal royalty rates have to be non-negative in cross-border transactions. We
use this non-negativity requirement for the internal royalty rate to display restrictions on inter-
nal transfer pricing. However, this surrogate is chosen for the sake of simplicity and convenient
presentation. Non-negativity is not necessary to obtain our results. Merely the existence of
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restrictions on internal transfer pricing decisions is needed, which are decidedly prevalent in
MNCs’ decision making (Graham et al., 2014).
If restrictions on transfer pricing are present, an investment subsidy is not possible because large
discrepancies should be avoided. Then, it is no longer straightforward that the foreign division
owns the intangible.
For a low spillover, namely β < βF , optimal investments can be achieved. If the spillover is
high, i.e., β > βF , first-best investments cannot be induced. Refraining from large discrepancies
in cross-border transactions curtails the MNC’s internal pricing possibilities. Thus, the MNC
has to trade off the conflicting objectives of tax minimization and investment incentives even
when decoupling internal and external decision making.
For a large spillover, ownership by the headquarters can be used to induce less distorted invest-
ment incentives for the domestic division by setting appropriate internal transfer prices. The
domestic division and the headquarters are located in the same tax jurisdiction. Hence, tax
avoidance via profit shifting between the headquarters and the domestic division is not an is-
sue.17 Tax authorities are resource constrained and therefore need to strategically choose which
transactions will be considered in greater detail (OECD, 2015). Therefore, it is most likely that
cross-border transactions are scrutinized because of the absence of a profit shifting motive in
purely domestic transactions. Thus, the headquarters can differentiate the royalty rates so that
the restriction on internal transfer pricing is only a concern in cross-border transactions.
If the headquarters owns the intangible, it charges royalty fees to both divisions. Hence, the
expected profits of the divisions are as follows:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+θD [γr (t+h)− γiD]
and
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+(θF +βθD) [γrt− γiF ] .
The headquarters receives the royalty payments. Because the headquarters is located in the
high-tax jurisdiction, all royalty income is taxed within the high-tax country. Thus, the expected
17 This holds true if there is no reduced tax rate for passive income, i.e., no IP-Box. Furthermore, we suppress the
possibility of loss carryforwards and hidden distributions.
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overall after-tax profit of the MNC is given by:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+(1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (θF +βθD) .
Obviously, the headquarters chooses γr in order to minimize its tax liability while complying
with the arm’s length principle. The internal trade is perfectly legal because the arm’s length
principle is not violated. Thus, the domestic division has to pay an internal royalty rate of:
γHQiD = γr (t+h)−β
(
1− t−hγr
)
.
The domestic division faces a royalty agreement that can be either positive or negative. How-
ever, the domestic tax authorities’ income is not affected. Thus, the MNC cannot be accused
of tax avoidance. The foreign division is incentivized with the following internal royalty rate
when the headquarters owns the intangible:
γHQiF = γr (t+h) .
In line with prior research, we show that the internal royalty rates depend on the externally
accepted royalty rate (Hyde and Choe, 2005; Haak et al., 2017).
If the indirect effect of the domestic division’s investment on the contribution margin of the
foreign division is high, i.e., β > βHQ, ownership by the headquarters becomes preferable.
The intuition is as follows. If the foreign division holds the intangible, tax savings might be
generated because profits are shifted to the low-tax jurisdiction. However, a high spillover leads
to a severe domestic investment distortion if the domestic division is not forced to internalize
this spillover. Hence, appropriate investment incentives become more important as the spillover
increases. Ownership by the headquarters leads to a less severe domestic investment distortion
because it allows for the subsidization of the domestic division’s investment and thus leads to
an internalization of the spillover.
Our findings are summarized in proposition 6 and illustrated in figure 4.
Proposition 6. In a TSB setting without restrictions on internal transfer pricing, the intangible
is located in the foreign division. With restrictions on internal transfer pricing and
• a low spillover, i.e., β < βHQ, the intangible is located in the low-tax foreign division
• a large spillover, i.e., β > βHQ, the intangible is located in the domestic headquarters
even though it is in the high-tax jurisdiction.
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Despite the absence of marginal costs, optimal transfer pricing schemes include non-zero inter-
nal royalty rates for a very low and a large spillover.
Figure 4: Expected Firm Profits with Foreign (F) and Headquarters (HQ) Ownership under
Restrictions on Transfer Pricing (plotted for γr = 0.1,γr = 0.5, t = 0.2,h = 0.15, and k = 3)
In contrast to the OSB setting, joint ownership is always dominated by foreign ownership for
an MNC keeping TSB. Similar to the OSB setting, the intangible is optimally held in the high-
tax jurisdiction under a high spillover, i.e., the ’home bias’ occurs. In particular, the spillover
is so important that profit shifting to the high-tax country is accepted. With OSB, a single
transfer price is used to provide investment incentives to both divisions. That is, higher domestic
investment incentives can only be achieved by reducing foreign investment incentives. While
decoupling under TSB allows better tax-saving behavior, the link between the domestic and
foreign investment incentives persists. However, by using headquarters ownership under TSB,
the investment incentives for the domestic and the foreign division can be separated. Therefore,
the headquarters can provide higher domestic investment incentives without harming foreign
investment incentives. Rather than locating the intangible in the domestic division as under
OSB, headquarters ownership is preferred under TSB.
Empirical findings suggest that intangibles are often located in the high-tax jurisdiction of an
MNC’s headquarters despite the presence of tax rate differentials and that profit shifting might
reduce the MNC’s tax liability (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Dischinger et al., 2014; Hecke-
meyer et al., 2018). Empirical studies conclude that the so-called ‘home bias’ is difficult to
explain. Potentially, part of this bias stems from spillovers and transfer pricing considerations.
We have shown that locating the intangible in the high-tax jurisdiction is preferable for a high
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spillover under TSB with restrictions on internal transfer pricing and OSB. That is, a ‘home
bias’ might occur whenever the MNC faces a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient
investment incentives.
The findings of proposition 6 imply that a high (low) spillover is associated with locating the in-
tangible in the high-tax domestic (low-tax foreign) jurisdiction. Patents relate to a specific tech-
nology, product, or process, whereas trademarks likely affect the entire business of an MNC.
That is, trademarks seems to have larger spillovers than patents. Thus, our model predicts that
trademarks exhibit a larger ‘home bias’ than patents. This empirical implication is supported.
Whereas Heckemeyer et al. (2018) document that 95.3 percent of US trademarks are located
in the US, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) depict that only 57.1 percent of patent applications
occur in the parent location. This finding seems to be especially surprising because the results
of Pfeiffer and Voget (2017) indicate that MNCs use trademarks more frequently for tax plan-
ning than they do patents. According to our model, this difference might stem from spillovers
and considerations regarding the prevention of inconclusive but costly disputes with the tax
authority.
Of course, there is a large body of additional explanations of the ‘home bias’. Typical exam-
ples are litigation costs, legal certainty in the home country, and exit taxes. We do not negate
all these potential explanations for the ‘home bias’. Our aim is to show that there might be
economic reasons in addition to all the other factors that might lead to a ‘home bias’. Hence,
the location choice of intangibles might be much more complex than it appears at first sight.
That is, although tax-saving potentials are considered in the location choice of the intangible,
the MNC also considers spillover effects. Our results might help to better understand reasons
for intangible location choice beyond pure tax and legal considerations.
6.3 Profit Shifting Effects on Investments
In the following, we investigate how our results are affected by varying exogenous factors. The
threshold βHQ determines the minimum spillover that is needed to optimally locate the intan-
gible in the high-tax jurisdiction under TSB with restrictions on internal transfer pricing. This
threshold is increasing in the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr. An increase in γr forces
the MNC with headquarters ownership to shift more profit from the low-tax to the high-tax
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jurisdiction, whereas the MNC’s profit under foreign ownership is unaffected. Thus, to induce
the MNC to locate the intangible at the headquarters, which is in the high-tax jurisdiction, the
investment incentives need to become more important. Therefore, the threshold βHQ increases
with a rise in γr. This is similar to the result under OSB in corollary 1. When the upper bound of
the arm’s length range γr increases, the MNC’s profit shifting possibilities under foreign own-
ership increase. The arm’s length price γr does not affect the MNC’s profit under headquarters
ownership. This means that solely foreign ownership becomes more attractive. Thus, a higher
spillover is required to make it optimal to assign ownership to the headquarters.
This finding is contrary to the OSB finding in corollary 1, where an increase in the upper bound
of the arm’s length range does not affect the location choice. The reason is that in the OSB
setting, the royalty rate for a medium spillover is smaller than the upper bound of the arm’s
length range. Therefore, the expected profits are unaffected.
A higher tax rate differential implies higher incentives for shifting profits to the low-tax juris-
diction. With foreign ownership, the MNC can optimally exploit legal tax-saving possibilities.
This is not possible with ownership by the headquarters because profits are shifted to the high-
tax country and then have to be taxed at the higher tax rate. Hence, foreign ownership becomes
more attractive. However, whereas foreign ownership results in a greater distortion of the do-
mestic investment decision, headquarters ownership allows better domestic investment. In order
to still outweigh the increasing benefits of foreign ownership due to an increase in the tax rate
differential, the minimum spillover βHQ has to increase to make headquarters ownership opti-
mal. This is similar to the OSB finding in corollary 1.
Corollary 2. The threshold level of the spillover βHQ is increasing in
• the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr,
• the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr, and
• the tax differential h for h < (1− t)/2.
When the spillover is high, its internalization becomes important. The internal royalty rate
becomes negative when preventing disputes with the tax authority is not an issue, i.e., no re-
striction on the internal transfer price is imposed. This can be interpreted as an investment
subsidy. Nevertheless, an increasing spillover leads to decreased internal royalty rates under
foreign ownership. Two effects on the headquarters’ expected profit occur. First, an increasing
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spillover leads to a higher foreign contribution margin. Second, the domestic investment affects
both the domestic and the foreign divisions’ contribution margins. Hence, with an increasing
spillover, the investment incentives of the domestic division become more important from the
headquarters’ perspective. If the MNC is interested in preventing long-lasting and expensive
disputes, ownership by the headquarters allows the implementation of less distorted domestic
investment. The headquarters faces a higher degree of freedom in the transfer pricing design if
the intangible is located in the high-tax jurisdiction. The internal royalty rate for cross-border
transactions does not depend on the spillover. However, the internal royalty rate for domes-
tic transactions decreases with an increasing spillover. In particular, the investment subsidy
increases because a higher spillover makes domestic investment incentives more important.
Proposition 7. An increasing spillover either decreases the internal royalty rate, or the internal
royalty rate is unaffected.
The finding of proposition 7 is similar to the result regarding foreign ownership under OSB
(proposition 3). However, proposition 3 states a contrary finding for domestic ownership under
OSB. With domestic ownership, the foreign division makes a royalty payment to the domestic
division. For a higher spillover and thus higher benefits from less distorted domestic investment,
the MNC induces the domestic division to invest more by using a higher royalty rate. When the
MNC already uses a corner value of the arm’s length range, a marginal increase in the spillover
benefits cannot be exploited by increasing the royalty rate.
Furthermore, we are interested in the effect of reducing the profit shifting possibilities. The
arm’s length range determines the MNC’s possibilities to engage in legal tax avoidance and cor-
responding profit shifting. In line with prior theoretical research (Desai et al., 2006; Hong and
Smart, 2010; Juranek et al., 2018) and empirical findings (Schwab and Todtenhaupt, 2017), we
can show that narrowing the arm’s length range and corresponding reduction in profit shifting
possibilities harms the investment incentives in the TSB setting. If the intangible is located in
the low-tax jurisdiction, the investment incentives provided to the domestic division decreases
if less profit shifting is possible. The investment incentives of the foreign division remain the
same because its investment affects only its own profits. In the case of headquarters ownership,
reducing profit shifting possibilities harms the investment incentives for both divisions.
Our result also contributes to prior findings of De Waegenaere et al. (2012), who show that a
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weaker enforcement of the arm’s length principle may improve social welfare. Under TSB, the
deterioration of the overall investment incentives due to reduced profit shifting possibilities is
not sensitive to the ownership location of the intangible. That is, tight transfer pricing regula-
tions may have negative impacts on real investment decisions. This finding is summarized in
Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Curtailing profit shifting possibilities by narrowing the arm’s length range leads
to decreased investment incentives for the MNC under TSB.
Parts of related OSB findings in proposition 4 are contrary to proposition 8. The difference
occurs because an MNC keeping OSB has to use a transfer price belonging to the arm’s length
range for both tax and internal objectives. Whenever a corner value of the arm’s length range
is applied, one of the purposes dominates. For example, the tax-saving objective dominates for
a very low spillover, so that the MNC locates the intangible in the low-tax foreign jurisdiction
and uses the upper bound of the arm’s length range as the transfer price. This allows maximal
legal profit shifting while providing little investment incentives for the domestic division. By
curtailing the profit shifting possibilities, the internal objective receives more emphasis. That
is, the MNC’s investment incentives increase. Propositions 4 and 8 illustrate that the effect of
curtailing profit shifting possibilities depends on the underlying accounting system and with
OSB additionally on the spillover’s magnitude. Both the accounting system and the spillover
are usually unobservable. As a consequence, regulators that curtail profit shifting possibilities
have difficulty estimating the consequences of their actions for MNCs’ investments. This makes
anti-avoidance regulation a complex task.
Next, we consider the impact of the tax rate differential h on the divisions’ investment incen-
tives. An increase in the tax rate differential decreases the domestic division’s after-tax invest-
ment costs because the investment costs are tax deductible. A higher tax rate differential does
not affect the benefits from the domestic division’s maintenance investment, so that in sum, the
domestic investment increases. This is true for both foreign and headquarters ownership.
The impact on the foreign division’s investment incentives depends on the location choice. First,
an increase in the tax rate differential does not affect the foreign division’s investment decision
at all in the case of foreign ownership. Second, under ownership by the headquarters, the foreign
division pays a positive external royalty rate for using the intangible. The headquarters in turn
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enjoys royalty income. An increase in the tax rate differential decreases the after-tax benefit
from this royalty income. However, the foreign division’s investment costs are unaffected. As a
consequence, headquarters provides less investment incentives through a higher internal royalty
rate. In sum, the location choice does not affect the impact of an increasing tax rate differential
on the domestic investment decision. The impact on the foreign investment decision depends
on the location choice.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the MNC keeps TSB. An increase in the tax rate differential
• increases the domestic investment,
• decreases (does not affect) foreign investment when the intangible is located in the high-
tax headquarters (low-tax foreign division).
Most parts of proposition 9 are contrary to the related OSB findings in proposition 5. Again,
using a single transfer price for both tax optimization and to provide investment incentives un-
der OSB is responsible for the difference. The tax rate differential affects the investments under
OSB only when neither of the inherent objectives dominates. This is the case when the transfer
price employed is not a corner value of the arm’s length range. A higher tax rate differential
increases the benefits from profit shifting to the low-tax jurisdiction so that the tax optimiza-
tion objective gains importance. With foreign ownership, the MNC increases the royalty rate to
shift more profits from the domestic to the foreign division. This curbs the domestic investment
benefits. As with TSB, the foreign investment benefits are unaffected. With domestic owner-
ship under OSB, the MNC decreases the royalty rate payable by the foreign to the domestic
division. Thus, the domestic division obtains a smaller part of the spillover. Therefore, the
marginal investment benefits decrease, while the marginal investment costs are unaffected. A
smaller royalty rate increases the foreign division’s marginal investment benefits, so that foreign
investment rises. As with curtailing profit shifting possibilities, the MNC’s accounting system
affects how changes in the tax rate differential influence the investments.
7 Conclusion
Intangibles are critical for an MNC’s success and are often unique but not exclusive in their
consumption. Furthermore, the use of an intangible is typically associated with no or negli-
gible marginal costs, and spillovers regularly occur. Nevertheless, when an intangible is used
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by several divisions, internal royalty payments are necessary to induce adequate maintenance
investments. In addition to this internal role of royalty payments, an external transfer price is
mandatory to report taxable income. Cross-border transactions are likely to entail tax audits.
Therefore, MNCs that are especially concerned with the prevention of disputes with the tax
authority refrain from large discrepancies between the internal and external transfer price.
We study the optimal royalty rates while endogenizing the location choice of an intangible.
Non-zero royalty rates are necessary to induce adequate maintenance investments because of a
spillover from the domestic to the foreign division’s contribution margin.
Our model highlights that without restrictions on the internal transfer price, the intangible is
located in the low-tax jurisdiction. This allows the MNC to optimally shift profits to minimize
its tax liability. This result is in line with initial intuition. However, it is well known that
large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices trigger increased scrutiny and
mistrust. MNCs that are interested in preventing disputes with the tax authority while keeping
TSB therefore consider restrictions on internal transfer prices.
If restrictions on the internal transfer price are present and spillovers are low, locating the intan-
gible in the low-tax jurisdiction is still optimal. However, for a high spillover, the MNC needs
to trade-off effective legal profit shifting and investment distortions. Beneficial profit shifting is
obtained when the intangible is held by the foreign division operating in the low-tax jurisdic-
tion. A higher spillover results in higher benefits from adequate maintenance investments. As
a consequence, for a large spillover, the benefits from less severe domestic investment distor-
tions exceed the costs arising from ineffective profit shifting. Thus, the intangible is located in
the high-tax domestic jurisdiction. A similar finding occurs when the MNC keeps OSB. This
provides a potential explanation for the ‘home bias’ found in the empirical literature.
Recently, governments and tax authorities have sought to curtail MNCs’ profit shifting possibil-
ities. In particular, the BEPS project is intended to reduce profit shifting. Our analysis illustrates
that the consequences of restricting profit shifting possibilities depend on several parameters.
Our work has identified the unobservable accounting system and spillovers as two factors influ-
encing the outcome of such regulations. Thus, curtailing profit shifting possibilities can either
increase or decrease the MNC’s investment incentives. This highlights the complexity that leg-
islators, tax authorities, and supranational organizations such as the OECD and the EU face
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when designing anti-avoidance legislation while preventing unintended outcomes.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
When the foreign division owns the intangible headquarters’ expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQ, f b
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+(1− t)
[
βθD+θF − k2θ
2
F
]
+hγrθD
The MNC is interested in the highest possible external transfer price, i.e., γr, in order to max-
imize its tax savings. Headquarters is interested in investment decisions maximizing overall
after-tax profits:
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1− kθ1)+β (1− t)+hγr (t+h) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1− kθ2) = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum: θD, f b and θF, f b.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We first consider all possible location choices in a no-tax world.
8.2.1 The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profits are given by:
E [ΠD] = θD− k2θ
2
D+ γ (θF +βθD)
and
E [ΠF ] = (1− γ)(θF +βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
The divisions choose their investments in order to maximize the divisional profit:
FOCθD : 1− kθD+ γβ = 0
SOCθD :−k < 0
FOCθF : 1− kθF − γ = 0
SOCθF :−k < 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum:
θDD =
1+ γβ
k
and
θDF =
1− γ
k
.
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The headquarters’ profit is equal to:
E [ΠHQ] = θD+θF +βθD− k2
(
θ 2D+θ
2
F
)
. (12)
First-best investments cannot be achieved. The headquarters chooses the transfer price in order
to maximize the overall profit given the division’s investments:
FOCγ :
1
k
[
β −1+β 2− 1
2
(
2β +2β 2γ−2+2γ)]
SOCγ :
1
k
((
2β 2+2
) ·−1
2
)
< 0.
Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum. The optimal transfer price is:
γD =
β 2
1+β 2
. (13)
8.2.2 The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division, incorporating royalty payments is:
E [ΠD] = (1− γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and the foreign division expects a profit of:
E [ΠF ] = θF +(γ+βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 8.2.1 yields:
θFD =
1− γ
k
and
θFF =
1
k
.
The headquarters objective remains in all no-tax scenarios unchanged and are depicted in (12).
First-best investments can easily be achieved setting γ =−β . The foreign division is willing to
accept a negative royalty payment administered by the headquarters because its expected profit
with the subsidy
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
+β
1+β
k
− k
2
1
k2
−β 1+β
k
=
1
2k
(14)
equals the expected profit of the foreign division if it denies access to the intangible for the
domestic division:
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
− k
2
1
k2
=
1
2k
.
First-best investments imply E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠDHQ
]
where the superscript denotes the location
choice of the intangible.
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8.2.3 Joint Ownership of the Intangible
In case of a joint ownership no division faces royalty payments. The expected profits are:
E [ΠD] = θD− k2θ
2
D
and
E [ΠF ] = θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 8.2.1 yields:
θ JD =
1
k
and
θ JF =
1
k
.
Despite the absence of royalty payments an investment subsidy might be profit enhancing. How-
ever, no subsidy can be found the foreign division is willing to accept. This result is due to the
joint ownership. No division is able to deny the other division access to the intangible. Hence,
both divisions use the intangible without permission of the other one. Thus, the expected profit
of the foreign division without subsidy:
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
+
β
k
− k
2
1
k2
=
1
2k
(1+2β ) (15)
is higher than with subsidy because (15)>(14).
The investment incentives with foreign ownership can easily replicate the incentives under con-
sideration using γ = 0. This implies that E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠJHQ
]
holds true so that joint ownership
of the intangible is strictly dominated.
8.2.4 The Headquarters owns the Intangible
Both divisions pay royalty fees for using the intangible. Expected profits are:
E [ΠD] = (1− γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and
E [ΠF ] = (1− γ)(θF +βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 8.2.1 yields:
θHQD =
1− γ
k
and
θHQF =
1− γ
k
First-best investments can be achieved using γHQD =−β and γHQF = 0. This implies E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
=
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
.
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We now provide an overview over possible location choices in a tax-world when OSB is kept.
8.3.1 The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division is given by:
E
[
ΠDD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD+ γ (βθD+θF)− k2θ
2
D
]
and the expected profit of the royalty paying foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠDF
]
= (1− t)
[
(1− γ)(βθD+θF)− k2θ
2
F
]
.
The divisions choose their investment levels in order to maximize their own after-tax profits.
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1+ γβ − kθD) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1− γ− kθF) = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum and the investments are:
θD,OSBD =
1
k
(1+ γβ ) (16)
and
θD,OSBF =
1
k
(1− γ). (17)
Headquarters expects the following profit:
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD,OSBD −
k
2
(
θD,OSBD
)2]
+(1− t)
[
βθD,OSBD +θ
D,OSB
F −
k
2
(
θD,OSBF
)2]−hγ (βθD,OSBD +θD,OSBF ) (18)
Differentiating headquarters’ expected profit with respect to γ yields:
FOCγ :
1
k
[
γ
(
2h−1+ t−β 2(1− t+h))+(1− t)β 2−h(1−β )]= 0
SOCγ :
1
k
[
2h−1+ t−β 2(1− t+h)] ,
which is negative for h < (1− t)/2. Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum. Hence, the
optimal royalty rate is:
γD,OSB1 =
(1− t)β 2−h(1+β )
β 2(1− t+h)+(1− t−2h) . (19)
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However, the royalty rate needs to belong to the arm’s length range. For γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and h< 1−t2 ,
γD,OSB1 ≥ γr if and only if
β ≥ βD,OSB1 :=
1
2(1− t− γr(1− t+h))
[
h+
√
h2+4(1− t− γr(1− t+h))(h+(1− t−2h)γr)
]
.
For γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and h < 1−t2 , γD,OSB1 ≤ γr if and only if
β ≤ βD,OSB2 :=
1
2(1− t− γr(1− t+h))
[
h+
√
h2+4(1− t− γr(1− t+h))(h+(1− t−2h)γr)
]
.
In sum, for γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and h < 1−t2 the optimal royalty rate is as stated in equation (6).
8.3.2 The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the royalty paying domestic division is given by:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
(1− γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and the expected profit of the foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθ1+θF + γθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 8.3.1 yields:
θF,OSBD =
1
k
(1− γ) (20)
and
θF,OSBF =
1
k
. (21)
Headquarters expects the following profit:
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θF,OSBD −
k
2
(
θF,OSBD
)2]
+(1− t)
[
βθF,OSBD +θ
F,OSB
F −
k
2
(
θF,OSBF
)2]
+hγθF,OSBD . (22)
Differentiating headquarters’ expected profit with respect to γ yields:
FOCγ :
1
k
[−γ (1− t+h)+h− (1− t)β ] = 0
SOCγ :−1
k
(1− t+h)< 0.
Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum and the optimal royalty rate is:
γF,OSB1 =
h−β (1− t)
1− t+h . (23)
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However, the royalty rate needs to belong to the arm’s length range. γF,OSB1 ≥ γr if and only if
β ≤ βF,OSB2 :=
h− γr(1− t+h)
1− t .
γF,OSB1 ≤ γr if and only if
β ≥ βF,OSB1 :=
h− γr(1− t+h)
1− t .
In sum, the optimal royalty rate is as stated in equation 2.
8.3.3 Joint Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠJD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and
E
[
ΠJF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 8.3.1 yields:
θ J,OSBD =
1
k
(24)
and
θ J,OSBF =
1
k
. (25)
Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θ J,OSBD −
k
2
(
θ J,OSBD
)2]
+(1− t)
[
θ J,OSBF +βθ
J,OSB
D −
k
2
(
θ J,OSBF
)2]
.
8.3.4 Headquarters’ Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division is:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
(1− γD)θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and the expected profit of the foreign division is:
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
(1− γF)(βθD+θF)− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 8.3.1 yields:
θHQ,OSBD =
1
k
(1− γD) (26)
and
θHQ,OSBF =
1
k
(1− γF). (27)
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Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θHQ,OSBD −
k
2
(
θHQ,OSBD
)2]
+(1− t)
[
(1− γ2)(θHQ,OSBF +βθHQ,OSBD )−
k
2
(
θHQ,OSBF
)2]
+(1−t−h)γ2
(
θHQ,OSBF +βθ
HQ,OSB
D
)
.
∂ 2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ21
=
1
k
(1− t−h)(−1)< 0
∂ 2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ22
=
1
k
(2h+ t−1),
which is negative for h < (1− t)/2.
∂ 2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ1∂γ2
=
∂ 2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ2∂γ1
=
1
k
βh.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is
1
k
[
(1− t−h)(1− t−2h)−β 2h2] ,
which is positive for h < (1− t)(3−√5)/2 < (1− t)/2. Thus, the Hessian matrix is negative
definite and the headquarters’ expected profit is concave.
The headquarters maximizes this expected profit under the restriction that the transfer prices
belong to the arm’s length range. This restriction satisfies the constraint qualification. Thus,
the Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are necessary for an optimal solution. The headquar-
ters expected profit is differentiable and concave in the non-negative orthant. According to the
Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem, transfer prices satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker maximum condi-
tions give a global maximum. In sum, the Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are necessary and
sufficient for a maximum.
For γD = γr and γF = γr, all Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are satisfied.
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
so that headquarters’ ownership is dominated by joint ownership. E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
if and only if β < βDJ , where
βDJ :=
h+
√
h2+(γr(1+h− t)+2(t−1))(γr(2h+ t−1)−2h)
2(1− t)− γr(1+h− t) . (28)
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥ E
[
ΠFHQ
]
if and only if β > βFJ , where
βFJ :=
2h+ γr(t−h−1)
2(1− t) and (29)
βD,OSB1 < β
F,OSB
2 < β
F
J < β
D
J < β
D,OSB
1 < β
D,OSB
2 .
Therefore, the intangible is located in the foreign division for β ∈ [0,βFJ ]. Joint ownership
dominates for β ∈ (βFJ ,βDJ ). The intangible is located in the domestic division for β ∈ [βDJ ,1].
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8.4 Proof of Corollary 1
This directly follows from calculating the first derivatives of equations (28) and (29) with respect
to γr, γr, or h.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in the foreign division. For β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
and β ∈[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
, γr and γr are used, respectively. Then, ∂γF,OSBr /∂β = 0. For β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
,
∂γF,OSBr /∂β < 0.
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division. For β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
and β ∈[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
, γr and γr are used, respectively. Then, ∂γD,OSBr /∂β = 0. For β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
,
∂γD,OSBr /∂β > 0.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the equations (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (8). For β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in
the foreign division so that the MNC invests θF,OSBD + θ
F,OSB
F in total. The first derivatives of
total investment with regard to γr and γr are:
∂
(
θF,OSBD +θ
F,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=
 0 for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB2
]
−1
k for β ∈
(
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
,
∂
(
θF,OSBD +θ
F,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

−1
k for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
0 for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F
J
]
.
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division so that the MNC invests θD,OSBD +
θD,OSBF in total. The first derivatives of total investment with regard to γr and γr are:
∂
(
θD,OSBD +θ
D,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

β−1
k for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,1
]
,
∂
(
θD,OSBD +θ
D,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=
 0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
2
]
β−1
k for β ∈
(
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
Decreasing γr and increasing γr jointly present curtailing profit shifting possibilities.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the equations (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (8). For β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in
the foreign division. The first derivatives of domestic and foreign investment with regard to h
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are:
∂θF,OSBD
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
−(1+β )(1−t)
k(1−t+h)2 < 0 for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
,
∂θF,OSBF
∂h
= 0,
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division. The first derivatives of domestic
and foreign investment with regard to h are:
∂θD,OSBD
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
β(1+β−β 2+β 3+β 4)(t−1)
k(−1+2h+t+β 2(t−h−1))2
< 0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
,
∂θD,OSBF
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
(1+β−β 2+β 3+β 4)(1−t)
k(−1+2h+t+β 2(t−h−1))2
> 0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 6
We now provide an overview over possible location choices in a tax-world keeping TSB.
8.8.1 The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of division 1 is given by:
E
[
ΠDD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
−k
2
θ 21
]
+ γi (βθD+θF)− (t+h)γr (βθD+θF)
and the expected profit of the royalty paying foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠDF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθD+θF − k2θ
2
F
]
− γi (βθD+θF)+ tγr (βθD+θF) .
Due to the tax rate differential the transfer price is not canceled out. The transfer pricing de-
cision affects MNC’s overall after-tax profit. Similar to the no-tax world the divisions choose
their investment levels in order to maximize their own after-tax profits. They have to take into
account the internal as well as the tax royalty rate.
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1− kθD)+ γiβ −βγr (t+h) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1− kθF)− γi+ tγr = 0
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SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum and the investments are:
θDD =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t−h)
[
β
(
γi− γr(t+h)
)]
(30)
and
θDF =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t)
[
tγr− γi
]
. (31)
The internal royalty rate γi affects both divisions’ investment decision so that first-best invest-
ments cannot be achieved. Hence, the headquarters maximizes its overall after-tax profit choos-
ing the internal royalty rate taking into account the divisions’ investment decisions.
FOCγi :
1
1− t−h
[
β 2γr (t+h)−β 2γi+β 2 (1− t)−β 2hγr
]
+
1
1− t
[
γr (t+h)− γi
]
= 0
SOCγi :
1
1− t−h
(−β 2)− 1
1− t < 0.
Hence, the optimal internal royalty rate is:
γDi =
1
1− t−h+β 2 (1− t)
[
β 2 (1− t)
(
tγr +1− t
)
+ γr (t+h)(1− t−h)]
]
. (32)
8.8.2 The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
− γiθD+ γrθD (t+h)
and of the foreign:
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+ γiθD− tγrθD.
Following the procedure used in section 8.8.1 yields:
θFD =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)− γi] (33)
and
θFF =
1
k
. (34)
Stipulating the following internal royalty rate induces first-best investments:
γFi = γrt− (1− t)β (35)
8.8.3 Joint Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠJD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
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 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314732 
and
E
[
ΠJF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 8.8.1 yields:
θ JD =
1
k
(36)
and
θ JF =
1
k
. (37)
By setting γi = γr (t+h) in 8.8.2 the investment incentives in 8.8.3 can be replicated. But
θ JD 6= θFD . Hence, E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠJHQ
]
.
8.8.4 Headquarters’ Ownership of the Intangible
The domestic (foreign) division pays a royalty rate γiD (γiF). The expected profit of the domestic
division is:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
− γiDθD+ γrθD (t+h)
and the expected profit of the foreign division is:
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθD+θF − k2θ
2
F
]
− γiF (βθD+θF)+ tγr (βθD+θF) .
Following the procedure used in section 8.8.1 yields:
θHQD =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)− γiD] (38)
and
θHQF =
1
k
+
1
k (1− t) [tγr− γiF ] . (39)
Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+(1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (θF +βθD) .
The MNC is interested in the lowest possible external transfer price, i.e., γr, in order to minimize
its tax liabilities. Headquarters is interested in investment decisions maximizing overall after-
tax profits:
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1− kθD)+β (1− t)−hβγr = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1− kθF)−hγr = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
The Hessian matrix is negative definite. Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum.
These second-best investments are induced by stipulating the following internal royalty rates:
γHQiD = γr (t+h)−
(
1− t−hγr
)
β (40)
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and
γHQiF = γr (t+h) . (41)
In a world without restrictions on transfer pricing the foreign division always owns the intangi-
ble, i.e., E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠDHQ
]
> E
[
ΠJHQ
]
and E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
.
With restrictions on transfer pricing, we have E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠJHQ
]
and E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
> E
[
ΠDHQ
]
.
Thus, either foreign or headquarters’ ownership is optimal. For β ≤ βF , foreign ownership
is optimal as E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
. For β > βF , foreign ownership dominates headquarters’
ownership if and only if
E
[
ΠFHQ
]≥ E [ΠHQHQ]
⇐⇒ δ := E [ΠFHQ]−E [ΠHQHQ]≥ 0
⇐⇒ 1
2k(1− t)(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
Aβ 2+Bβ +C
]≥ 0,
where
A := (t−1)
(
t+ γrh−1
)2
< 0,
B := 2(t−1)
[
γrh(t+h−1)+ γr(t−1)(t+h)
]
> 0, and
C := 2γrh(t−1)(t+h−1)+ γrh(t+h−1)(γrh+2t−2)+ γr2(t−1)(t2−h2). (42)
Due to A < 0, δ is inversely U-shaped in β . Setting δ equal to zero yields two thresholds
β1 =
1
2A
[
−B+
√
B2−4AC
]
and
βHQ =
1
2A
[
−B−
√
B2−4AC
]
.
β1 is smaller than βHQ. Using E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
for β = βF and that δ is inversely U-shaped
in β yields that for β < βHQ (β > βHQ), E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠHQHQ
] (
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
< E
[
ΠHQHQ
])
. As the
example in figure 4 demonstrates, βHQ can be smaller than 1. Thus, headquarters’ ownership
can become optimal.
8.9 Proof of Corollary 2
As stated in the proof of proposition 6, the threshold βHQ is determined by Aβ 2+Bβ +C = 0
(see equations (42)). Define G := Aβ 2+Bβ +C.
∂G
∂βHQ
= 2AβHQ+B < 0.
∂G
∂γr
= 2h
β (1− t)(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+β 2(1− t)(1− γrh− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(1− t−h)(1− γrh− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
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Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂γr
=−∂G
∂γr
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
∂G
∂γr
= 2(1− t)
h(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+β (1− t)(h+ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+γr(h2− t2)
 ,
which is positive for β ≥ βF . Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂γr
=−∂G
∂γr
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
∂G
∂h
= 2γr2h(1− t)+2γr(1− t)(1− t−2h+β (1− t))+
γr
[
γrh(3h−2(1− t))+2(1+β )(1− t)(1− t−2h)+2β 2(1− t)(1− γrh− t)
]
,
which is positive for h < (1− t)/2. Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂h
=−∂G
∂h
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
8.10 Proof of Proposition 7
For β ≤ βHQ, the intangible is located in the foreign division. The internal transfer price is
given by: γFi = tγr− (1− t)β , where γFi is non-zero if there is no restriction on tax-avoidance
or if restrictions are present for β < βF and γFi = 0 for βF ≤ β ≤ βHQ. A non-zero internal
royalty rate decreases with an increasing spillover:
∂γFi
∂β
=−(1− t)< 0.
Otherwise, if γFi = 0 the internal royalty rate is unaffected.
For β > βHQ, the intangible is held in the headquarters. The internal royalty rate for purely
domestic transactions is given by: γHQiD = γr (t+h)−
(
1− t−hγr
)
β and the internal royalty
rate for cross-border transactions is γHQiF = γr (t+h) . Thus, the internal royalty rate for purely
domestic transactions decreases with an increasing spillover:
∂γHQiD
∂β
=−(1− t)+hγr < 0.
The internal royalty rate for cross-border transactions is unaffected.
8.11 Proof of Proposition 8
For β ≤ βHQ, the intangible is located in the foreign division. For β ≤ βF , first-best invest-
ments are achievable and are given by θFD =
1
k +
1
k(1−t−h) [(1− t)β +hγr]. If βF < β ≤ βHQ
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an investment distortion occurs; the distorted investment decisions of the domestic division is
given by (33). The derivative is
∂θFD
∂γr
=
 hk(1−t−h) > 0 for β ∈
[
0,βF
]
t+h
k(1−t−h) > 0 for β ∈
(
βF ,βHQ
]
.
Thus, curtailing profit shifting, i.e., decreasing γr, leads to decreasing investments in the domes-
tic division. The investment decision of the foreign country is shown in (34). The investment
incentives are unaffected and remain the same so that the MNC’s overall investment decreases.
For β > βHQ, the intangible is located in the headquarters. The investment decisions are de-
scribed in (38) and (39). The derivatives with respect to the external royalty rate are:
∂θHQD
∂γr
=
−hβ
k (1− t−h) < 0
and
∂θHQF
∂γr
=
−h
k (1− t) < 0.
Thus, curtailing profit shifting possibilities, i.e., increasing γr, leads to less investments in both
divisions.
8.12 Proof of Proposition 9
With foreign ownership the derivative of the domestic division’s investment with respect to the
tax rate differential is:
∂θFD
∂h
=

γr
k(1−t−h)2 > 0 for β ∈
[
0,βF
]
(1−t)(γr+β )
k(1−t−h)2 > 0 for β ∈
(
βF ,βHQ
]
.
With foreign ownership the derivative of the foreign division’s investment with respect to the
tax rate differential is
∂θFF
∂h
= 0.
With headquarters’ ownership the derivatives of both divisions’ investments with respect to the
tax rate differential are
∂θHQD
∂h
=
β (1− t)(1− γr)
k (1− t−h)2 > 0
and
∂θHQF
∂h
=
−γr
k (1− t) < 0.
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